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Bail Reform: A Possible Solution to 
Missouri’s Broken Public Defender System? 
Dana Kramer* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Bail reform is currently sweeping through the United States.  Over forty 
jurisdictions have implemented new bail systems based on empirical data that 
aim to assist judges in determining bail and to reduce the use of cash bail.1  
Missouri, following the lead of many other states, has introduced new court 
rules from the state’s Supreme Court that embrace this bail reform 
movement.2  The state’s bail reform intersects with the issues facing the 
Missouri Public Defender System (the “MSPD”).  The MSPD suffers from 
excessive caseloads and gross underfunding, both of which significantly 
undermine public defenders’ ability to provide effective counsel to indigent 
defendants.3  Because indigent defendants are the class of persons most 
affected by the current bail system, the bail reform movement is largely meant 
to impact them.  
Bail reform in several jurisdictions is not producing these intended 
effects and is instead posing many risks to indigent defendants’ pretrial 
procedural and constitutional rights.  This Note considers the bail reform in 
Missouri, which took effect in 2019, as well as its implications on Missouri 
public defenders and the indigent defendants they represent.  To do so, Part II 
first relates the constitutional protections afforded to indigent defendants and 
examines the problematic history of the MSPD.  Part III delves into recent 
attempts in Missouri to remedy the MSPD’s problems, including the state’s 
proposed bail reform, and compares bail reform in Missouri with other states 
who have also adopted new bail systems.  This Note then concludes, in Part 
 
*  B.S., Culver-Stockton College, 2017; J.D. Candidate, University of Missouri School 
of Law, 2020. Thank you to Professor Rodney Uphoff for sharing your expertise and 
passion for this topic with me and thank you to the editorial staff of the Missouri Law 
Review for their helpful insight during the editing process. 
 1. See Meghan Stevenson, Assessing Risk Assessment in Action, 103 MINN. L. 
REV. 303, 345 (2017). 
 2. See infra Section III.C. 
 3. See, e.g., Chris Dandurand, Note, Walking Out on the Check: How Missouri 
Abandoned Its Public Defenders and Left the Poor to Foot the Bill, 76 MO. L. REV. 
185 (2011).  
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IV, with a discussion of the consequences of the new bail system and offers 
suggestions to improve Missouri’s bail reform. 
II.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
A criminal defendant’s right to counsel is constitutionally rooted in the 
Sixth Amendment: “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the 
right . . . to have Assistance of Counsel for his defense.”4  The Missouri 
Constitution contains a similar right in its Bill of Rights: “That in criminal 
prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and defend, in person 
and by counsel . . . .”5  This right ensures that indigent defendants – 
defendants who cannot afford an attorney – receive representation in their 
criminal case.6  This Part provides background on the development of this 
right.  Section A details the rights afforded to indigent criminal defendants 
under the Sixth Amendment, and Section B focuses on attempts in Missouri 
to provide this right to indigent defendants. 
A.  The Supreme Court’s Interpretation of the Sixth Amendment  
In 1963, the United States Supreme Court in Gideon v. Wainwright 
interpreted the Sixth Amendment’s right to counsel to extend to persons 
charged with a felony.7  Gideon involved an indigent defendant in Florida who 
was convicted of a felony and sentenced to eight years’ incarceration.8  A 
Florida state court denied the defendant appointment of a public defender 
because Florida law at the time only allowed the court to appoint a public 
defender in capital cases.9  Stating that “any person hailed into court, who is 
too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is 
provided for him,” the Supreme Court distinguished the right to counsel as 
“fundamental and essential in fair trials.”10  The Supreme Court concluded 
that indigent persons charged with felonies have a constitutional right to 
counsel.11  The Supreme Court further held that this right is applied to all 
states through the Fourteenth Amendment.12   
However, Gideon only addressed the right to counsel in felony cases.13  
The Supreme Court did not extend the Sixth Amendment right to counsel to 
misdemeanor cases until 1972.14  In Argersinger v. Hamlin, a defendant 
 
 4. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 5. MO. CONST. art. I, § 18(a). 
 6. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963) 
 7. Id. at 345.  
 8. Id. at 338.  
 9. Id. at 336–37.  
 10. Id. at 344.  
 11. Id.  
 12. Id. at 341–42.  
 13. Id. at 342.  
 14. See Argersinger v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 25 (1972). 
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charged with a misdemeanor offense and sentenced to ninety days in jail 
alleged that he was deprived of his right to counsel as an indigent defendant.15  
The Supreme Court considered the historical roots of the Sixth Amendment, 
noting that twelve of the thirteen colonies recognized the right to counsel in 
all criminal cases, including petty offenses.16  The Supreme Court then 
discussed and applied the rationale of Gideon, reasoning that the legal and 
constitutional questions presented in misdemeanor cases are no less complex 
merely because the person charged may be imprisoned for six months or 
less.17  Therefore, the Supreme Court extended the right to counsel to 
misdemeanor and petty offense prosecutions where the defendant faces the 
possibility of incarceration.18  
The Supreme Court held in Rothgery v. Gillespie County that the right 
to counsel attaches when “formal judicial proceedings have begun,” or, in 
other words, when a criminal defendant first appears before a judge and learns 
of the charges against him.19  As a result of Rothgery and Argersinger, many 
states, such as Wisconsin, require attorneys to represent criminal defendants 
when the defendant first appears in court and bail is set.20  In some states, 
however, defendants do not appear with counsel at their initial appearance, 
meaning that these defendants may not be appointed counsel for weeks or 
months.21 
The Supreme Court further specified the right to counsel in McMann v. 
Richardson as entitlement to effective counsel.22  The Missouri Supreme 
Court, in 2012, likewise followed the holding that “the Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel is a right to effective and competent counsel,”23 which 
“requires counsel to appropriately investigate, prepare, and present [a] client’s 
case.”24   
The United States Supreme Court has declined to specify what effective 
counsel entails.25  However, the American Bar Association (the “ABA”) 
published the Criminal Justice Standards for the Defense Function 
 
 15. Id. at 26.  
 16. Id. at 30.  
 17. Id. at 31–33.  
 18. Id. at 36–37.  
 19. Rothgery v. Gillespie County, 554 U.S. 191, 211, 213 (2008). 
 20. See WIS. STAT. § 970.01 (2018); see also DeWolfe v. Richmond, 76 A.3d 
1019, 1031 (Md. 2013) (“[W]e hold that . . . an indigent defendant is entitled to state-
furnished counsel at an initial hearing . . . .”). 
 21. See Douglas Colbert et al., Do Attorneys Really Matter? The Empirical and 
Legal Case for the Right to Counsel at Bail, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1719, 1782 (2002). 
 22. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970). 
 23. State ex rel. Mo. Public Def. Comm’n v. Waters, 370 S.W.3d 592, 597 (Mo. 
2012) (en banc). 
 24. Taylor v. State, 262 S.W.3d 231, 249 (Mo. 2008) (en banc). 
 25. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (“More specific 
guidelines are not appropriate . . . . The proper measure of attorney performance 
remains simply reasonableness under prevailing professional norms.”). 
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(“Standards”) to “provide guidance for the professional conduct and 
performance of defense counsel.”26  These Standards include:  
a duty of confidentiality . . . a duty of communicating and informing 
the client . . . a duty of carrying an appropriate workload that will not 
interfere with providing qualify representation . . . a duty of 
establishing a relationship with the client and maintaining that 
relationship . . . a duty of investigating in all cases . . . a duty of 
preparing for court proceedings in advance . . . [and] a duty of 
considering and relating to the client consequences that may arise from 
a charge, plea, or conviction and the effects of this on sentencing.27 
Missouri State Public Defender Guidelines for Representation, 
principally tracking the Standards language, specifically state the 
responsibilities of Missouri public defenders.28  Additionally, the Missouri 
Supreme Court Rules of Professional Conduct prescribe that attorneys act 
with “reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client” and keep 
clients reasonably informed about their case.29 
Though effective counsel is a constitutional right to which every 
criminal defendant facing incarceration is entitled and the ABA provides 
guidelines on how to meet this responsibility, many criminal defendants 
across the United States, and particularly in Missouri, do not receive effective 
counsel from state public defenders.30  Inadequate funding for public defender 
systems and increasing caseloads undermine an indigent defendant’s doctrinal 
right to effective counsel.31  The MSPD has been one of the most 
dysfunctional public defender systems in the United States for the past few 
decades.32  
B.  Missouri’s Public Defender System 
In the aftermath of Gideon, Missouri courts appointed attorneys to 
represent indigent defendants without pay.33  However, the Missouri Supreme 
 
 26. Criminal Justice Standards for the Defense Function- Standard 4-1.1(a), AM. 
BAR ASS’N (Apr. 16, 2015), 
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/criminal_justice/standards/DefenseFunctionFo
urthEdition/ [perma.cc/LA28-RK45]. 
 27. Id. (discussing Standards 4-5.4 and 4-8.3). 
 28. See Expert Report of Rodney J. Uphoff at 4–5, Church v. Missouri, 268 F. 
Supp. 3d 992, 996–97 (W.D. Mo. 2017) (No. 17-04057-CV-C-NKL), 2017 WL 
9857219. 
 29. MO. SUP. CT. R. 4-1.3, 4-1.4. 
 30. See Rodney Uphoff, Foreword, 75 Mo. L. Rev. 667, 669–70 (2010). 
 31. Lauren Sudeall Lucas, Note, Effectively Ineffective: The Failure of Courts to 
Address Underfunded Indigent Defense Systems, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1731, 1734 
(2005). 
 32. Uphoff, Foreward, supra note 30, at 670. 
 33. See State v. Green, 470 S.W.2d 571, 573 (Mo. 1971) (en banc). 
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Court soon held in State v. Green that the responsibility of representing 
indigent defendants was not the duty of Missouri attorneys but was 
constitutionally “the burden of the State.”34  In 1972, the state legislature 
responded to Green with the enactment of Chapter 600 of the Missouri 
Revised Statutes.35  Chapter 600 created the MSPD and the Public Defender 
Commission (the “PDC”), which governs the entire MSPD and establishes 
criteria for indigency.36  This new legislation created a dual system for 
handling indigent cases, which consisted of fourteen local public defender 
offices and appointed counsel programs where private attorneys would 
contract with the State to represent indigent defendants at a set fee.37  
However, the MSPD soon faced issues of underfunding, as the amount 
appropriated to the MSPD remained stagnant while caseloads increased 
dramatically.38  In fiscal year 1980, less than ten years after the MSPD’s 
inception, the MSPD ran out of funds nearly two months before the fiscal year 
ended.39  As a result, local public defender offices were grossly underfunded 
and contracted attorneys were not paid for their work.40 
The Missouri Supreme Court was soon called upon to compel the 
General Assembly to pay attorneys for their work in State ex rel. Wolff v. 
Ruddy.41  Reluctant to violate the separation of powers, the court concluded 
that it could not force the legislature to provide more funds to the MSPD.42  
However, the court found that it could require members of the Missouri Bar 
to provide representation.43  The court’s decision left Missouri attorneys to 
continue representing indigent defendants despite a gross lack of funding and 
the possibility of never receiving compensation.44   
The Missouri legislature responded to Ruddy in 1982 with the creation 
of the Office of the State Public Defender (the “OSPD”), a department 
 
 34. Id. (citing State v. Rush, 217 A.2d 441, 446 (N.J. 1966)). 
 35. MO. REV. STAT. § 600.011 (2018). 
 36. See State ex rel. Wolff v. Ruddy, 617 S.W.2d 64, 65 (Mo. 1981) (en banc) 
(per curiam); MO. REV. STAT. ch. 600 (2018). MO. REV. STAT. § 600.086 (2018) 
(defining indigency as: “[a] person shall be considered eligible for representation . . . 
when it appears from all the circumstances of the case including his ability to make 
bond, his income and the number of persons dependent on him for support that the 
person does not have the means at his disposal or available to him to obtain counsel 
in his behalf . . . .”). 
 37. State ex rel. Mo. Pub. Def. Comm’n v. Pratte, 298 S.W.3d 870, 876 (Mo. 
2009) (en banc).  
 38. Fiscal Year 2018 Annual Report, STATE OF MO. PUB. DEF. COMM’N 5, 9, 
https://publicdefender.mo.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/MSPD-2018-Annual-
Report-Print-Copy-Color-10172018.pdf [perma.cc/BA83-AUKD]. 
 39. State ex rel. Wolff, 617 S.W.2d at 65. 
 40. Id. at 66.  
 41. Id. at 64.  
 42. Id. at 65.  
 43. Id.  Attorneys must be a member of the Missouri Bar to practice in the state 
of Missouri. Id.   
 44. Id. at 66–67.  
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independent of the judicial branch that was authorized to set guidelines for 
determining indigency.45  The OSPD could also appoint private counsel to 
represent indigent defendants.46  But finding private attorneys willing to 
represent indigent defendants became increasingly difficult, spurring 
reorganization of the MSPD.47  The MSPD was restructured into three 
specialized divisions: the Capital Division, the Appellate/Post-Conviction 
Relief Division, and the Trial Division.48  Today, the MSPD consists of thirty-
three district offices, six appellate sections, and three capital sections.49  
Private attorneys are still contracted to handle indigent cases, with 
approximately thirteen percent of the MSPD’s caseload being contracted to 
the private bar in 2018.50 
However, these legislative actions proved ineffectual and funding 
remained excessively low.51  A 2009 study conducted by the Spangenberg 
Group found that Missouri had “the lowest per-capita expenditures of all 
states, except for Mississippi,”52 and in 2013, the National Juvenile Defense 
Center found Missouri’s indigent defense system to be “in crisis” as a result 
of the many years of immense caseloads and insufficient resources.53  In 2018, 
the MSPD disposed of over 70,000 cases with only 384 full-time attorneys 
employed.54   
The immense pressure of high caseloads, inadequate resources, and low 
salaries resulted in 15.5% of attorneys leaving the MSPD in 2018.55  The 
MSPD’s 2018 annual report credits the high turnover rate to staggering 
 
 45. Our Distinguished History, MO. STATE PUB. DEF. (2017), 
https://publicdefender.mo.gov/about-mspd/history-of-mspd/ [perma.cc/XL4C-
XYMT].  The OSPD was under the control of the Public Defender Commission. Id. 
 46. Id.  
 47. See State ex rel. Mo. Pub. Def. Comm’n v. Pratte, 298 S.W.3d 870, 876 (Mo. 
2009) (en banc). 
 48. Our Distinguished History, supra note 44.  The Capital Division handles first 
degree murder cases in which the state is seeking the death penalty and juvenile first-
degree murder cases with the possibility of life without parole. Fiscal Year 2018 
Annual Report, supra note 38.  The Appellate/Post Conviction Relief Division handles 
appeals and post-conviction relief cases. Id. at 53.  The Trial Division handles felonies, 
misdemeanors, juvenile cases, and probation violations. Id. at 16. 
 49. Fiscal Year 2018 Annual Report, supra note 38, at 1. 
 50. Id. at 63.  
 51. Press Release, Mo. State Pub. Defender, Public Defender Commission 
Adopts Rule to Limit Availability of Overloaded Offices to Take on More Cases (Nov. 
2, 2007). 
 52. Id.  
 53. Mary Ann Scali et al., Missouri: Justice Rationed; An Assessment of Access 
to Counsel and Quality of Juvenile Defense Representation in Delinquency 
Proceedings, THE NAT’L JUV. DEFENSE CTR. 7, 33 (2013), 
http://njjn.org/uploads/digital-library/Missouri-Justice-Rationed-Assessment-of-
Access-to-Counsel-NJDC-2013.pdf [perma.cc/HG5U-MHAH]. 
 54. Fiscal Year 2018 Annual Report, supra note 38, at 13–14. 
 55. Id. at 7.  
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student debt and overwhelming caseloads.56  The high turnover leaves few 
experienced attorneys at the MSPD, resulting in new, inexperienced attorneys 
handling serious felony cases.57  The turnover rate affects supervision within 
the MSPD, as supervisors are expected to handle their own caseloads in 
addition to reassigning cases to remaining attorneys and hiring and training 
new attorneys.58   
The turnover rate combined with excessive caseloads lowers the quality 
of representation provided to indigent defendants.59  When public defenders 
handle hundreds of cases alone, the amount of time devoted to each indigent 
defendant decreases drastically, often resulting in public defenders being 
underprepared or not prepared at all for trial.60  The turnover rates can also 
result in indigent defendants being appointed multiple different public 
defenders throughout their case, meaning that each newly appointed public 
defender must meet the client and orient themselves with the case.61 
Recognizing the issues with the MSPD, the Missouri Senate created an 
Interim Committee to review the MSPD system in 2007.62  The Committee’s 
report recommended that caseloads be reduced, staff numbers increased, base 
salaries increased, and funding added “through supplanting unconstitutional 
court costs and providing additional appropriations.”63  The PDC’s annual 
report that year similarly found that the high caseload was overwhelming to 
the point that public defenders would have to start declining new cases.64 
In 2009, the Missouri Senate responded and introduced Senate Bill 37, 
which would have set “caseload maximums and contract[ed] with private 
attorneys to handle cases exceeding those maximums.”65  Though the Bill 
passed with ease through both the Senate and the House of Representatives, 
then-Governor Jay Nixon vetoed the bill.66   
With Governor Nixon’s heavy hand on the veto, the MSPD turned to the 
courts for relief.67  The PDC adopted 18 C.S.R. Section 10-4.010, which 
created a procedure that allowed public defenders to refuse new cases.68  
 
 56. Id.  
 57. See Uphoff, supra note 28, at 12. 
 58. Id.  
 59. Id. at 12–13; see generally Richard A. Oppel Jr. & Jugal K. Patel, One 
Lawyer, 194 Felony Cases, and No Time, THE N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 31, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/01/31/us/public-defender-case-
loads.html?searchResultPosition=1 [perma.cc/Z7Q6-SQ4Q]. 
 60. Uphoff, supra note 28, at 13–14. 
 61. Id. at 27.  
 62. Id. at 14.  
 63. Id. (internal citations omitted).   
 64. Id. at 15.  
 65. Id.  
 66. Id.  
 67. Uphoff, supra note 28, at 15. 
 68. 18 C.S.R. 10-4.010 (2009); Uphoff, supra note 28, at 15.  Section 10-4.010 
“authorized the MSPD director to declare an office of limited availability when its 
7
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Section 10-4.010 allows the public defender’s office to select “categories of 
cases to be designated for exclusion from public defender representation once 
the district is certified . . . as of limited availability.”69  
In State ex rel. Missouri Public Defender Commission v. Pratte, the 
public defender’s office in Boone County, Missouri, after being designated as 
of limited availability, notified the circuit court that it would not accept any 
new probation violation cases where a suspended execution of sentence had 
been imposed.70 A public defender attempted to utilize this policy and filed a 
notice with the court that the public defender’s office was unavailable to 
represent an indigent defendant whose probation was suspended.71  Despite 
this, the judge appointed the public defender to the case.72   
As a result, the PDC, the Director of the MSPD, and the appointed public 
defender filed a petition for a writ of prohibition.73  The Missouri Supreme 
Court held that Section 10.4-010 denied an indigent defendant the right to 
representation.74  The court further posited that the PDC could not 
categorically reject a certain class of cases, finding that refusing to accept 
probation violation cases contradicted the PDC’s obligation to represent all 
indigent defendants: “Indigent defendants who are accused of violating their 
probation have the same Sixth Amendment right to counsel as all other 
indigent defendants who face the possibility of imprisonment.”75  The court 
then offered suggestions on how to “reduce the demand for public defender 
services,” recommending that prosecutors agree to limit the number of cases 
where the state seeks incarceration and that judges withhold from appointing 
counsel in certain cases.76   
After Pratte, the MSPD continued to rely on Section 10-4.010 to manage 
its caseload.77  However, in 2012, the same issue in Pratte appeared again 
before the Missouri Supreme Court in State ex rel. Missouri Public Defender 
Commission v. Waters.78  In Waters, the Director of the MSPD certified a 
district defender’s office as of limited availability pursuant to Section 10-
 
caseload became excessive,” which was determined on “an office exceeding the 
maximum caseload standard for a period of three consecutive months.” Uphoff, supra 
note 28, at 15 (quoting 18 C.S.R. 10.4.010 (2009)) (Subsection 18 CSR 20-
4.010(2)(E) voided by State ex rel. Mo. Pub. Def. Comm’n v. Pratte, 298 S.W.3d 870 
(Mo. 2009) (en banc))). 
 69. State ex rel. Mo. Pub. Def. Comm’n v. Pratte, 298 S.W.3d 870, 884 (2009) 
(quoting 18 C.S.R. 10-4.010).  Certification of limited availability allowed a public 
defender’s office to decline to take new cases. Id. 
 70. Id. at 883.  
 71. Id. at 884.  
 72. Id. at 883–84.  
 73. Id. at 881, 884–85.  
 74. Id. at 883.  
 75. Id. at 885.  
 76. Id. at 887.  
 77. See Uphoff, supra note 28, at 17. 
 78. See State ex rel. Mo. Pub. Def. Comm’n v. Waters, 370 S.W.3d 592 (2012) 
(en banc). 
8
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 85, Iss. 1 [2020], Art. 12
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol85/iss1/12
2020] BAIL REFORM 305 
4.010.79  Despite this, and over objection, a judge appointed a public defender 
to represent the defendant.80  The MSPD moved to set aside the appointment 
because it violated Section 10-4.010.81  The Missouri Supreme Court 
reiterated its holding from Pratte that regardless of the resources available for 
the defense of an indigent defendant, a judge must ensure that such defendant 
receives effective counsel.82   
Governor Nixon again impeded repair of the MSPD in 2015 when he 
withheld almost three million dollars from the MSPD.83  Frustrated with 
Governor Nixon’s actions, Michael Barrett, the Director of the MSPD, 
appointed Governor Nixon, who had an active law license, to represent an 
indigent defendant.84  Barrett relied on Section 600.042.5 of the Missouri 
Revised Statutes, which grants the director of the MSPD the power to 
“delegate the legal representation of an eligible person to any member of the 
state bar of Missouri,” to appoint Governor Nixon.85  A Missouri court, 
however, disallowed the appointment on the basis that courts have the sole 
power to appoint counsel.86  Though unsuccessful, Barrett’s attempted 
appointment made national headlines and brought further attention to the 
ongoing struggles of the MSPD.87 
III.  RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 
Missouri’s efforts to address the crisis facing the MSPD have thus far 
been ineffective.88  Recently, however, new avenues have been proposed to 
remedy this.  One such attempt involves a group of criminal defendants who 
brought a class action asking the judiciary to compel the legislature to 
adequately fund the MSPD.89  Alternatively, new court rules that seek to 
 
 79. Id. at 600–01.  
 80. Id. at 601.  
 81. Id. at 602.  
 82. Id. at 606 (quoting State ex rel. Mo. Pub. Def. Comm’n v. Pratte, 298 S.W.3d 
870, 875 (2009) (en banc)). 
 83. Fiscal Year 2018 Annual Report, supra note 38, at 9.  Governor Greitens also 
withheld funds in the amount of $3.5 million from the MPSD in 2017. Id. 
 84. Celeste Bott, Court Rules Public Defender Can’t Appoint Missouri Governor 




 85. Matt Ford, A Governor Ordered to Serve as a Public Defender, THE 
ATLANTIC (Aug. 4, 2016), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/08/when-the-governor-is-your-
lawyer/494453/ [perma.cc/G3AK-6SR2]; MO. REV. STAT. § 600.042.5 (2018). 
 86. Bott, supra note 84. 
 87. Id.  
 88. See supra Part II. 
 89. See Church v. Missouri, 913 F.3d 736, 741–42 (8th Cir. 2019). 
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modify traditional judicial discretion took effect recently in Missouri.90  This 
Part begins with a discussion of Church v. Missouri, followed by a discussion 
of a national bail reform movement and Missouri’s bail reform. 
A.  Church v. Missouri 
In 2017, a group of Missouri criminal defendants attempted a different 
approach at a potential judicial remedy.91  The defendants brought a putative 
class action to challenge the adequacy of the MSPD.92  In Church v. Missouri, 
the plaintiffs alleged violations of their constitutional rights under both the 
United States and Missouri Constitutions and sought prospective relief for 
both themselves and other defendants in Missouri “who are eligible to be 
represented by the MSPD.”93  The plaintiffs named the State of Missouri and 
then-Governor Eric Greitens as defendants (“Defendants”).94 
The named plaintiffs of the class (“Plaintiffs”) each experienced 
frustrations with the MSPD.95  Plaintiff Shondell Church, arrested and 
charged in 2016 for felony theft, did not meet his appointed public defender 
until he had spent over forty days in jail and was not informed of a subsequent 
change in his legal representation during the course of his case when his 
originally appointed attorney left the MSPD.96  Plaintiff Randall Lee Dalton, 
having physical and mental disabilities, could not access his medication while 
incarcerated and did not appear before a tribunal until almost two months after 
his arrest because Dalton’s appointed public defender waived Dalton’s 
appearance and reset his case without Dalton’s knowledge.97  Plaintiff Dorian 
Samuels, facing a thirty-year sentence for assault, had a total of three public 
defenders appointed to him during the course of his case.98  Samuels’ third 
public defender wrote Samuels to inform him of the probable forthcoming 
inadequate representation due to the attorney’s overwhelming caseload.99  
Plaintiff Viola Bowman’s public defender continued her trial at least ten times 
due to his obligations in other cases and managerial duties, resulting in 
Bowman’s pretrial incarceration for over 800 days.100  Plaintiff Brian 
Richman, as a result of his public defender waiving his right to appear at 
 
 90. See H.R. 666, 100th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2019). 
 91. See Church v. Missouri, 268 F. Supp. 3d 992, 996–97 (W.D. Mo. 2017), rev’d 
913 F.3d 736 (8th Cir. 2019). 
 92. Id. at 997.  
 93. Id. at 1008.   
 94. Id.  Governor Greitens resigned as governor while this case was pending 
appeal. Id. at 754 n.1.  Per Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 43(c)(2), his successor, 
Michael Parson, was automatically substituted as a defendant. Id. 
 95. Id. at 1002–07.  
 96. Id. at 1002–03.  
 97. Id. at 1004.  
 98. Id.  
 99. Id. at 1006.  
 100. Id. at 1007.  
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hearings without first obtaining his consent, began writing letters directly to 
the judge to advocate on his own behalf.101 
Of the five named plaintiffs, none had counsel present with them when 
bail was set.102  Randell was held on bond despite not seeing a judge or an 
attorney.103  Though Plaintiffs could not afford the bail that had been set, none 
of their public defenders advocated for a reduction of bail amount.104  
Moreover, the public defenders failed to conduct any investigation or pretrial 
motion practice on behalf of their clients.105   
Plaintiffs filed expert reports from Professors Robert Boruchowitz and 
Rodney Uphoff.106  In his report, Professor Boruchowitz concluded that 
Plaintiffs “[were] constructively denied counsel in violation of the 6th 
Amendment” due to various structural and systemic problems, including 
inadequate funding, enormous caseloads, insufficient training and attorney-
client communications, and “a disparity of resources between prosecution and 
defense.”107  Professor Uphoff similarly found that “Missouri public 
defenders are handling too many cases leaving defenders insufficient time or 
the resources to do all of the tasks needed to adequately defend their 
clients.”108 
Defendants moved to dismiss the class action, arguing that sovereign 
immunity barred Plaintiffs’ claims.109  The United States District Court for 
the Western District of Missouri denied the State’s motion to dismiss.110  The 
court held that Plaintiffs claims against the Defendants were not barred by 
sovereign immunity because, under Missouri law, the state has no immunity 
from claims seeking equitable relief and because then-Governor Greitens – 
being responsible for the enforcement of Missouri laws – had a sufficient 
connection to the challenged conduct.111   
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit disagreed, 
however.112  The Eighth Circuit stated that “sovereign immunity applies 
 
 101. Id. at 1007–08. 
 102. Id. at 1002, 1004–07. 
 103. Id. at 1004.  
 104. Id. at 1002–07.  
 105. Id.  
 106. Robert Boruchowitz worked as a public defender in Washington for over 
thirty years and has written extensively on public defender standards and restructuring 
public defender systems. Expert Report of Robert C. Boruchowitz at sec. III, Church, 
268 F. Supp. 3d (No. 17-04057-CV-C-NKL), 2017 WL 9857221.  Rodney Uphoff is 
an Emeritus Professor at the University of Missouri-Columbia School of Law. Uphoff, 
supra note 28, at 1. He has written numerous articles on criminal defense, indigent 
defense services, and ethical issues facing those working in the criminal justice 
system. Id. 
 107. Boruchowitz, supra note 106, at ¶¶ 5, 7. 
 108. Uphoff, supra note 28, at 24–25. 
 109. Church, 268 F. Supp. 3d at 1009. 
 110. Id. at 996. 
 111. Id. at 1011–13. 
 112. Church v. Missouri, 913 F.3d 736, 741 (8th Cir. 2019). 
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unless it is waived or a statutory or recognized common law exception, such 
as consent, is applicable.”113  Finding no waiver or common law exception in 
its de novo review, the Eighth Circuit concluded that sovereign immunity 
barred Plaintiffs’ claims.114  Neither the district court nor the Eighth Circuit 
addressed Plaintiffs’ allegations of constitutional violations.115   
B.  Bail Reform in the United States 
The United States Supreme Court recognized in the early twentieth 
century that bail is “perhaps the most critical period of the proceedings.”116  
Church v. Missouri briefly touched on the issue of bail, which is currently 
receiving national reformation.117  In Church, all Plaintiffs were held on bail 
but could not afford to pay.118  Plaintiffs did not have counsel present when 
bail was set.119  This is typical for Missouri’s indigent defendants, though 
studies have proven that representation at initial hearings significantly 
increases the number of defendants released on their own recognizance.120  
Moreover, two-and-a-half times as many represented defendants had their bail 
reduced to an affordable amount as compared to unrepresented defendants.121   
In states where many defendants initially appear before the court without 
an attorney present, as in Church, the court generally sets bail at a 
predetermined amount, which is based upon the charged offense instead of an 
assessment of the defendant’s ability to pay.122  If bail is set, a bail bondsman 
will charge the defendant a fee to post bond for the defendant.123  Once the 
case is dissolved, the court returns the money to the bondsmen, resulting in a 
profit to the bondsman.124  If the defendant is unable to pay for bail himself or 
pay the bondsman’s fee, the court detains the defendant until bond is posted, 
modified to an amount that the defendant can pay, or the case concludes.125 
This bail process leads to excessive detention because detainment is 
based on a defendant’s ability to pay bail.126  Many defendants are detained 
not because they are a flight risk or a threat to society but because they are 
 
 113. Id. at 743.  
 114. Id. at 745–46.  
 115. See generally id.  
 116. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 57 (1932). 
 117. See Church v. Missouri, 268 F. Supp. 3d 992, 1014 (W.D. Mo. 2017), rev’d 
913 F.3d 736 (8th Cir. 2019). 
 118. Id. at 1002, 1004–07.  
 119. Id.  
 120. See Colbert, supra note 21, at 1720. 
 121. Id.  
 122. Note, Bail Reform and Risk Assessment: The Cautionary Tale of Federal 
Sentencing, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1125, 1127 (2018). 
 123. Id.  
 124. Id.  
 125. Id.  
 126. Id.  
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unable to post bail.127  Nearly two-thirds of jailed persons in the United States 
have not been convicted but are in jail because they cannot afford bail.128  As 
many of these defendants qualify as indigent, their cases are sent to state 
public defender offices, adding to the already overwhelming caseloads.129   
Some states, like New Jersey, have turned to bail reform to decrease the 
number of defendants incarcerated after bail hearings.130  Implemented in 
2017, New Jersey’s bail reform aimed to replace judicial discretion regarding 
pretrial detention with an objective, scientific assessment based on empirical 
data and risk factors.131  The empirical data is largely supplied by criminal 
justice statistics.132  The reform created a Pretrial Services Program, a unit 
within the criminal division of the New Jersey Judiciary tasked with preparing 
automated risk assessments, called Public Safety Assessments (“PSA”), 
which recommend conditions of release for each criminal defendant.133  PSAs 
utilize nine risk factors that measure a defendant’s risk of failure to appear 
and risk of committing new criminal activity before trial.134  These factors 
include: age at current arrest; current violent offense; pending charge at the 
time of the offense; prior misdemeanor convictions; prior felony convictions; 
prior violent convictions; prior failure to appear pretrial in the past two years;  
prior failure to appear pretrial older than two years; and prior sentence to 
incarceration.135   
Each of the nine factors adds points to a defendant’s raw score.136  For 
example, if a defendant failed to appear pretrial within the last two years, a 
 
 127. Id.  
 128. See id. at 1127.  
 129. Id. at 1130.  
 130. Id.; John Gregory, Prospects for Bail Reform in Kentucky, PBS: KY. EDUC. 
TELEVISION (Feb. 19, 2019, 8:30 AM), https://www.ket.org/public-affairs/prospects-
bail-reform-kentucky/ [perma.cc/G2K6-HXE8]; Rebeca Ibarra, New Jersey’s Bail 
Reform Law Gets Court Victory, WNYC NEWS (Jul. 9, 2018), 
https://www.wnyc.org/story/new-jerseys-bail-reform-law-gets-court-victory/ 
[perma.cc/DJ9T-QVFH]; Vanessa Romo, California Becomes First State to End Cash 
Bail After 40-Year Fight, NPR (Aug. 28, 2018, 10:49 PM ET), 
https://www.npr.org/2018/08/28/642795284/california-becomes-first-state-to-end-
cash-bail [perma.cc/DAM3-732P]. 
 131. Note, Bail Reform and Risk Assessment, supra note 122, at 1130; see N.J. 
STAT. ANN. § 2A:162-25 (2017). 
 132. Youngjin Choi, Lessons from California and New Jersey Bail Reform 




 133. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162-25 (2017). 
 134. Public Safety Assessment: New Jersey Risk Factor Definitions – December 
2018, 1–4, https://www.njcourts.gov/courts/assets/criminal/psariskfactor.pdf?c=R6P 
[perma.cc/438C-CYH8]. 
 135. Id.  
 136. Note, Bail Reform and Risk Assessment, supra note 122, at 1131.  
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point would be added to his risk assessment score.137  A defendant’s points 
are totaled into a raw score.138  The raw score is then converted to a six-point 
scale, with one being low risk and six being high risk.139  These nine factors 
are weighed to compute three prediction scores: a failure to appear score, a 
risk of new criminal activity score, and a risk of new violent criminal activity 
score.140  These scores are then reported to the court.141  Judges reference the 
PSA report at bail hearings to determine whether to set bail, release the 
defendant on his or her own recognizance, or detain the defendant.142 
New Jersey’s PSA proved popular, and other states began implementing 
similar bail reforms.143  Risk assessments are used in approximately forty 
jurisdictions, including Alaska and California.144  California adopted an 
algorithmic system similar to New Jersey’s model, and its system 
categorically prohibits pretrial release for certain classes of crimes, such as 
violent felonies and felonies involving a deadly weapon.145  Additionally, 
California’s bail reform entirely eliminated cash bail.146  Instead, a court will 
release a defendant on his or her own recognizance with nonmonetary 
conditions “that will reasonably assure the public safety and the person’s 
return to court” or the defendant will be detained.147  The outcome depends in 
part on the defendant’s raw score from the risk assessment.148   
Many of these bail reform systems also create a presumption of detention 
for certain classes of offenses.149  In 2020, California will vote on an 
additional proposal to the state’s reformed system that, will create a 
presumption that “no condition or combination of conditions of pretrial 
supervision will reasonably assure [public safety] pending arraignment” if the 
crime charged is a violent felony, the arrested person was on a form of 
postconviction supervision or threatened a witness, or the arrested person has 
violated a condition of pretrial release.150  Such instances may lead to first-
time offenders being incarcerated pretrial or may compel a defendant to plead 
guilty in return for immediate release.151 
 
 137. Public Safety Assessment, supra note 134, at 1–4. 
 138. Note, Bail Reform and Risk Assessment, supra note 122, at 1131. 
 139. Id.  
 140. Public Safety Assessment, supra note 134, at 1–4. 
 141. Note, Bail Reform and Risk Assessment, supra note 122, at 1131. 
 142. Id.  
 143. See Romo, supra note 130, at 2. 
 144. See ALASKA STAT. § 33.07.010 (2018); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1320.10(e) (West 
2019); see also Stevenson, supra note 1, at 307, 342. 
 145. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1320.10(e) (West 2019). 
 146. § 1320.10(d). 
 147. § 1320.10(c). 
 148. § 1320.10. 
 149. § 1320.10(c). 
 150. § 1320.13. 
 151. Choi, supra note 132, at 3–4. 
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The structure of the risk assessment tool varies by jurisdiction.152  For 
example, Alaska developed two scales to convert a defendant’s risk 
assessment score, unlike New Jersey which uses one scale to produce three 
separate scores.153  One of the scales produces a risk score for failure to appear 
and the other provides a risk score for new criminal arrest.154  Alaska’s Pretrial 
Enforcement Division, tasked with performing pretrial risk assessments, then 
uses the highest score of the two scales when making its recommendations to 
the court.155  Within states like Colorado, Missouri, and Texas who have yet 
to officially pass a bail reform, courts will be required to create and implement 
risk assessment tools as well as determine which factors its assessment will 
consider.156 
This bail reform movement is similar to federal efforts to reform 
sentencing guidelines in the late twentieth century.157  Prior to reform, federal 
judges had great discretion in sentencing, which resulted in sentencing that 
widely varied across jurisdictions.158  Congress subsequently passed the 
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, establishing the Sentencing Commission.159  
The Sentencing Commission formulated sentencing guidelines that were 
“intended to limit sentencing disparities and to ensure that sentences would 
‘adhere to a consistent sentencing philosophy.’”160  Under the new guidelines, 
judges would score the characteristics of the offense and the offender based 
on a rubric that would then relay a sentencing range.161   
This federal sentencing reformation largely failed.162  Soon after the 
guidelines were established, Congress began to override the goals of the 
guidelines by imposing congressionally mandated minimum sentences and 
sentencing ranges.163  These sentencing schemes forced judges to impose 
overly lengthy sentences on defendants who they would otherwise have given 
 
 152. See ALASKA STAT. § 33.07.010 (2018); H.B. No. 19-1226, 72d Gen. Assemb., 
1st Reg. Sess. (Co. 2019); H.B. 94, 2019 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2019); H.B. 
1323, 86th Legis., Reg. Sess. (Tx. 2019). 
 153. See Pamela Cravez, Pretrial Risk Assessment Tool Developed for Alaska, 
UNIV. OF ALASKA ANCHORAGE JUST. CTR., https://www.uaa.alaska.edu/academics/co 
llege-of-health/departments/justice-center/alaska-justice-forum/34/3winter2018/a.pre 
trial-risk-assessment.cshtml [perma.cc/ZHW8-2K3S] (last visited Nov. 12, 2019). 
 154. Id.  
 155. Id.  
 156. H.B. No. 19-1226, 72d Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Co. 2019); H.B. 666, 
100th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2019); H.B. 1323, 85th Legis., Reg. Sess. 
(Tx. 2019). 
 157. Note, Bail Reform and Risk Assessment, supra note 122, at 1134. 
 158. Id.  
 159. Id.  
 160. Id. (quoting S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 59 (1983)). 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id.  
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a shorter sentence or placed on probation.164  Additionally, reduced judicial 
discretion led judges to increase reliance on prosecutorial 
recommendations.165  As a result of their increased influence, prosecutors 
often recommended to judges that a given defendant be incarcerated pending 
trial, leading to an influx in federal jail populations.166  Consequently, the 
Sentencing Reform Act makes it easier for prosecutors and judges to detain 
defendants who are presumed innocent for weeks or months as their cases 
pend.167  This remains the case today.168 
C.  Bail Reform in Missouri 
In January 2019, Missouri joined the reform bandwagon when Missouri 
Supreme Court then-Chief Justice Zel Fischer announced new court rules.169  
During his State of the Judiciary speech, Chief Justice Fischer outlined the 
major changes the new rules will bring, including restructuring the courts’ 
approach to ordering release or detainment.170  Highlighting the motivation 
for these changes, Chief Justice Fischer noted the number of people who 
cannot afford bail and who, as a result, “lose their jobs, cannot support their 
families, and are more likely to reoffend.”171  Chief Justice Fischer 
commented that the judiciary has a responsibility to ensure that accused 
persons are treated fairly under the law without regard to their ability to pay.172 
The new rules, which became effective on July 1, 2019, modify Missouri 
Court Rules of Criminal Procedure 21, 22, and 33.173  These changes adjust 
how courts determine whether to detain an arrested person or to grant 
conditional release.174  When a defendant is arrested under a warrant, he must 
appear before a judge within forty-eight hours of confinement for this 
determination to be made.175  For a defendant charged with a bailable offense, 
 
 164. See id. at 1136.  
 165. Id. at 1135.  
 166. Id. at 1137.  
 167. Id.   
 168. Although the federal government has taken steps to reform the federal 
criminal justice system, these efforts, specifically the FIRST STEP Act signed by 
President Donald Trump in 2018, generally do not affect arraignment proceedings or 
defendants who are incarcerated pretrial. See First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-
391, 132 Stat 55194, https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/house-
bill/5682/text [perma.cc/V34U-LSR6]. 
 169. Hon. Zel M. Fischer, State of the Judiciary, Jefferson City, January 2019, 
MO. COURTS (Jan. 24, 2018), https://www.courts.mo.gov/page.jsp?id=136253. 
 170. Id.  
 171. Id.  
 172. Id.  
 173. Order Dated December 18, 2018, Re: Rules 21, 22, and 33, MO. COURTS § 
21.09 (Dec. 18, 2018), https://www.courts.mo.gov/page.jsp?id=134633. 
 174. Fisher, supra note 169. 
 175. Order Dated December 18, 2018, Re: Rules 21, 22, and 33, supra note 173, 
at § 21.09. 
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the court must first consider nonmonetary conditions of release, seeking “the 
least restrictive condition or combination of conditions of release.”176  In 
doing so, the court must evaluate the likelihood of the defendant reappearing 
at trial or other stages of the proceedings and the safety of the community, 
victims, and witnesses.177  If the court determines that nonmonetary 
conditions will not secure the defendant’s appearance or provide protection, 
the court may then consider monetary conditions or a combination of 
monetary and nonmonetary conditions.178   
When imposing monetary conditions, the court must evaluate the 
defendant’s ability to pay and cannot impose a higher payment than necessary 
to ensure the defendant appears at trial or the community’s safety.179  Only 
upon a determination by clear and convincing evidence may a court detain a 
defendant pretrial.180  Whether the defendant should be released or detained 
is determined on a case-by-case basis.181 
Following the Missouri Supreme Court’s lead, Missouri’s General 
Assembly introduced a bill that would codify these new court rules.  Titled 
the Money Bail Reform Act of 2019 (the “MBRA”), the Act was introduced 
in the Missouri House of Representatives in January 2019.182  As of the time 
of the writing of this Note, the MBRA had been referred to the Crime 
Prevention and Public Safety Committee in the House of Representatives, 
where the bill subsequently died.183  The MBRA was modeled after bail 
reforms in other jurisdictions, where public defenders and civil rights groups 
are now attacking the effectiveness of those bail.  The next Section discusses 
the criticisms of bail reform and potential issues with Missouri’s bail reform 
movement. 
IV. DISCUSSION 
Public defenders across the United States are criticizing the bail reform 
movement.184  In Virginia, public defenders argue the new bail reform is 
 
 176. Id. at § 33.01(c).  
 177. Id.  
 178. Id.  
 179. Id.  
 180. Id. at § 33.01(d).  
 181. Id. at § 33.01(e).  
 182. H.B. 666, 100th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2019).  This bill would 
have enacted provisions under Chapter 544 of Missouri’s Criminal Procedure statutes 
pertaining to arrest, examination, commitment and bail. Id.  
 183. Id.  
 184. See, e.g., Alice Cherem & Carly Taylor, Bail Reform Hasn’t Led to Fewer 
Held in Jail, Court Records Show, MD. REPORTER (Jan. 1, 2019) 
https://marylandreporter.com/2019/01/01/bail-reform-hasnt-led-to-fewer-held-in-
jail-court-records-show/ [perma.cc/2PXZ-QNF6].; Choi, supra note 132; Alex Koma, 
Public Defenders Blast Arlington Prosecutor’s Cash Bail Reforms as ‘Misleading’ 
and Ineffective, ARL NOW (Nov. 15, 2018, 3:45 PM), 
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ineffective and merely pledges to follow the law that is already in place, 
particularly the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of excessive bail.185  In 
California, public defenders pulled their support before the state’s bail reform 
bill passed, reasoning that the bill gave too much power to judges and relied 
too heavily on the risk assessment tool.186  Additionally, the American Civil 
Liberties Union and other civil rights organizations criticized the algorithms 
as inherently flawed because “they perpetuate racial disparities within the 
criminal justice system.”187  
In addition to heavy criticism from both public defenders and civil rights 
groups, bail reform does little to protect indigent defendants’ right to effective 
counsel because the reform does not reduce public defenders’ caseloads or 
increase funding.  This Part first addresses the effects and criticisms of bail 
reform, then discusses methods to improve the bail system in Missouri. 
A.  The Effects of Bail Reform 
The ultimate goal of bail reform is to reduce pretrial incarceration 
rates.188  Bail reform seeks to align this goal with ensuring pretrial justice and 
preserving the presumption of innocence.189  But like the federal Sentencing 
Reform Act, bail reform has thus far been heavily criticized for not producing 
these expected outcomes.190   
For instance, Maryland is experiencing the opposite effects as those 
intended by its bail reform.191  Though the use of cash bail has decreased in 
the state, a 2018 study found that Maryland judges have replaced cash bail 




 185. Koma, supra note 184.  The Eighth Amendment states that “[e]xcessive bail 
shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed . . .” U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
 186. Abbie Vansickle, So Much for the Great California Bail Celebration, THE 
MARSHALL PROJECT (Aug. 30, 2018), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2018/08/30 
/so-much-for-the-great-california-bail-celebration [perma.cc/ENM4-Z7LL]. 
 187. Madeleine Carlisle, The Bail-Reform Tool That Activists Want Abolished, 
THE ATLANTIC (Sept. 21, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/0 
9/the-bail-reform-tool-that-activists-want-abolished/570913/ [perma.cc/L2ZA-
SBL4]. 
 188. Note, Bail Reform and Risk Assessment, supra note 122, at 1144. 
 189. Id.  
 190. See Christopher Zoukis, Maryland Bail Reform Backfires, Drives Up Number 
of Inmates, ZOUKIS PRISONER HANDBOOK (Jul. 19, 2018), 
https://www.prisonerresource.com/prison-reform/maryland-bail-reform-backfires-
drives-up-number-of-inmates/ [perma.cc/U5RC-F8LP]. 
 191. Id.  
 192. Cherem & Taylor, supra note 184; Prince George’s County: A Study of Bail, 
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no bail increased by over fourteen percent, whereas the percentage of 
defendants released with no bail increased by only two percent.193  Moreover, 
the study found that the jail population remained the same after the reform 
took effect.194   
A similar result was found in Kentucky.195  There, a study on judicial 
tendencies after bail reform was passed concluded that “[i]f judges followed 
the recommendations associated with the risk assessment, ninety percent of 
defendants would be granted immediate non-financial release.  In practice, 
only twenty-nine percent are released on non-monetary bond at the first bail-
setting.”196  The results in Kentucky show that the judicial discretion impedes 
the effectiveness of bail reform.197  In California, many civil rights 
organizations pulled their support from the state’s bail reform bill because of 
the great breadth of discretion the bill provided judges.198 
Bail reform is criticized for being institutionally biased as well.199  Risk 
assessments base their algorithms on data largely provided by criminal justice 
statistics.200  This data contains race, gender, and socio-economic 
disparities.201  Because risk assessments are based on data “influenced by 
structural racism,” they produce results that are therefore discriminatory.202  
This may cause certain classes of individuals to be incarcerated pretrial for 
low-level offenses where such individuals would not have been detained 
before bail reform.203  In California, over one hundred organizations, in 
withdrawing support from the bail reform bill, signed a statement saying that 
“automated predictions based on such data – although they may seem 
objective or neutral – threaten to further intensify unwarranted discrepancies 
in the justice system and to provide a misleading and undeserved imprimatur 
of impartiality for an institution that desperately needs fundamental 
change.”204   
With these criticisms in mind, Missouri should consider educating 
judges on the dangers of no bail provisions. Alternatively, Missouri could 
direct judges, through either Chief Justice George W. Draper III or the General 
 
 193. Prince George’s County, supra note 192, at 11. 
 194. Id. at 9.  
 195. Stevenson, supra note 1, at 362–63. 
 196. Id. at 310–11.  
 197. Id. at 311. 
 198. See Vansickle, supra note 186. 
 199. Id.; Choi, supra note 132. 
 200. Choi, supra note 132; Vansickle, supra note 186. 
 201. Carlisle, supra note 187; Essie Justice Group Withdraws Support for SB 10, 
ESSIE JUST. GRP. (Aug. 14, 2018), https://essiejusticegroup.org/2018/08/essie-justice-
group-withdraws-support-for-sb-10/ [perma.cc/6UPC-BLGH]. 
 202. Carlisle, supra note 187; Choi, supra note 132. 
 203. Choi, supra note 132; The Use of Pretrial “Risk Assessment” Instruments: A 
Shared Statement of Civil Rights Concerns, http://civilrightsdocs.info/pdf/criminal-
justice/Pretrial-Risk-Assessment-Full.pdf [perma.cc/2WKP-KLA6]. 
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Assembly, to approach bail hearings with the presumption of release without 
monetary conditions unless there is clear evidence of risk of flight or danger 
to public safety.  As seen in Kentucky and Maryland, when judges are 
presented with the option of releasing defendants without bail, granting 
conditional release, or detaining defendants without bail, judges are more 
likely to detain without bail, which is the opposite of the MBRA’s goals.205  
Creating a presumption of release without bail rather than a presumption of 
detainment, as California did for certain offenses, 206 would better serve the 
goals of bail reform.  Prosecutors would then be required to overcome this 
presumption, which would preserve a defendant’s presumption of innocence, 
encourage equality in pretrial litigation, and reduce the number of persons 
detained after initial appearances.   
B.  Missouri’s Money Bail Reform Act and the MSPD 
The MSPD is currently suffering from gross underfunding and 
debilitating caseloads.207  The new court rules will not significantly alleviate 
these problems or change the quality of representation a public defender can 
provide to an indigent defendant.  The struggles the MSPD experiences do not 
change when a defendant is granted conditional release or released on his or 
her own recognizance.208   
Arguably, bail reform may have some positive effects on the adequacy 
of representation public defenders could provide.  Reform may increase and 
improve communication between a defendant and his public defender because 
defendants can access more forms of communication outside of jail.  
Defendants released conditionally or without bail may also be able to aid their 
public defender in obtaining critical evidence and locating witnesses.  
Although this may be helpful, public defenders, burdened with hundreds of 
cases and the stress of being under-resourced, lack the time necessary to 
conduct thorough investigations, perform motion practice, and research to 
prepare a defense.209  The new court rules do little to remedy the fact that 
indigent defendants are not being afforded their right to effective counsel. 
A defendant who is no longer required to pay bail may be able to afford 
a private attorney or at least the attorney’s retention fee.210  If defendants hire 
private attorneys, the number of cases assigned to public defenders should 
decrease.  When the costs of discovery, motion practice, and investigation are 
factored in, however, the total cost of private representation is much higher 
 
 205. Prince George’s County, supra note 192; Stevenson, supra note 1, at 354–
57. 
 206. See infra Part II.B. 
 207. Id.  
 208. Id.  
 209. Uphoff, supra note 28, at 23. 
 210. Uphoff, Foreword, supra note 30, at 669.  
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than an initial retention fee or a bail amount.211  Many low-income defendants 
cannot afford the total cost of hiring a private attorney.212  Although, in theory, 
defendants released on bail have more of an opportunity to hire a private 
attorney, in practice few will be able to do so.  Consequently, the reform is 
likely to have little effect on the overwhelming caseloads of the MSPD. 
But there are ways to improve Missouri’s bail system so that public 
defenders can provide effective counsel to indigent defendants.  One method 
is to require indigent defendants to be represented by public defenders at 
initial appearances.213  Currently in Missouri, as depicted in Church, public 
defenders are not required to appear at arraignment. 214  Rather, a defendant 
may make a showing of indigency at the initial appearance, and only upon a 
determination of indigency will the court then appoint counsel to the 
defendant.215  Without defense counsel present to advocate for a defendant, 
judges rely on prosecutorial recommendations, their own experience, and the 
nature of the crime charged when determining bail.216  While Missouri’s bail 
reform facially eradicates this custom, in practice the effect may not be as 
comprehensive as intended because the new court rules defer to a court’s 
judgment when determining bail.  The rules merely provide more factors to 
consider during arraignment.  As a result, a defendant in Missouri may 
continue to wait in jail for weeks or months after his or her initial appearance 
before being appointed a public defender.217   
Many arrested persons face low-level misdemeanor charges, which are 
offenses that generally should not require bail or detainment and which, 
according to Argersinger, entitle the defendant to representation.218  Requiring 
representation at bail hearings forces the court’s focus to the front end of the 
criminal process, increasing the likelihood that these low-level cases will be 
dismissed and discouraging prosecution of such minor offenses.219  In cases 
that continue past initial appearances, indigent defendants are less likely to be 
detained or have bail set when provided representation at the bail setting 
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stage.220  Public defenders and their ability to argue on behalf of indigent 
defendants regarding bail are therefore imperative to protecting indigent 
defendant’s pretrial procedural rights.   
In order to have public defenders present at initial appearances, 
Missouri’s General Assembly must increase funding to the MSPD.  Properly 
funding the MSPD would allow the system to hire more attorneys.  Greater 
manpower would increase the amount of time a public defender can spend on 
a case.  At the moment, Missouri public defenders are forced to pick which 
cases to allocate their attention.221  The result is that misdemeanors and lesser 
felonies – the cases that would benefit the most from representation at bail 
hearings – generally go uninvestigated.222  Much of the investigation for these 
cases happens right before trial, which decreases the likelihood that critical 
evidence and witnesses will be found.223  Additionally, public defenders do 
not have time for aggressive motion practice or legal research, and excessive 
caseloads restrict the public defenders’ ability to litigate discovery issues.224  
Increasing funding to allow for the hiring of more attorneys would fix this 
problem.  Public defenders would be able to properly investigate each case 
and effectively represent clients in a manner that satisfies Gideon and its 
progeny.   
Additionally, increased funding and greater manpower would reduce the 
number of cases appointed to each public defender.  This, in turn, would afford 
public defenders the time to represent indigent defendants at initial 
appearances.  Public defenders could then argue on behalf of indigent 
defendants for a conditional release, a release on the defendant’s own 
recognizance, or a reduced bail amount.  For indigent defendants, having a 
public defender argue for, and potentially obtain, these results could allow 
defendants to keep their jobs, avoid eviction from their homes, and continue 
to support their families, which, as then-Chief Justice Fischer pointed out, is 
the goal of the new court rules and bail reform.225  The new court rules give 
too much deference to judges and prosecutors without allowing defense 
counsel the opportunity to advocate for their clients at arraignment, with the 
likely result being that indigent defendants charged with low-level offenses 
remain incarcerated due to failure to post bail.226   
V.  CONCLUSION 
The new court rules have the potential to provide positive outcomes for 
indigent defendants and the MSPD.  However, Missouri should consider how 
bail reform in other states have panned out and be wary of the benefits 
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promised by the reform that will actually be delivered.  Missouri’s legislature 
should instead focus on providing adequate funding to the MSPD.  This will 
enable public defenders to represent indigent defendants at initial 
appearances, which will improve the quality of representation public 
defenders can provide.  Proper funding will additionally negate the need to 
establish a new agency that the state government will have to fund.  This, in 
turn, will bring Missouri one step closer to improving the MSPD and 
providing indigent defendants with their constitutionally protected Sixth 
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